Skip to main content
Vote

Queering Democracy Monitor

Anti-LGBTIQ Campaigning and Barriers to Queer People’s Electoral Participation Worldwide

Learn More

January - June 2026

The map below shows countries around the world where anti-LGBTIQ campaigning and barriers to queer people’s political participation were documented in elections from January 1 to June 30, 2026.

Published: September 15, 2026
 

Alternative: In Numbers

As of September 15, 2026, Outright has collected data—through online desk research or exchanges with activists—on 24 countries that held elections from January 1 to June 30, 2026.

Candidates or parties engaged in anti-LGBTIQ campaigning in at least

14

of 24 countries studied in this period

Reported candidates or parties engaging in anti-LGBTIQ campaigning

9

of 24 countries studied in this period

Reported openly LGBTIQ candidates experiencing discrimination or violence

4

of 24 countries studied in this period

Reported trans, gender-diverse, or intersex voters experiencing identity-based barriers

Methodology

This map is based on information received by Outright from activists through online interviews and correspondences, civil society monitoring reports, and online desk research.
 

Armenia

Parliamentary elections: June 7, 2026

A Russian-backed disinformation campaign claimed that a Pride march would take place in Armenia with the support of the ruling Civil Contract party, in an effort to portray the party as supportive of the “LGBTQ agenda” and, therefore, hostile to so-called traditional Armenian values.

  • Anti-LGBTIQ campaigning and political speech: Ahead of the election, a disinformation campaign, which experts attributed in part to Russian groups, sought to portray the ruling party as supporting “LGBT propaganda” and, therefore, hostile to so-called traditional values. In January 2026, a self-described Turkish journalist, known to propagate pro-Russian narratives, made the false claim that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan approved the organization of a Pride parade, which was then amplified by both pro-Russian social media users and Georgian media platforms. Unidentified detractors also created a fake organization called the “Armenian Queer Union” and contacted Armenian media and foreign LGBTIQ activists, claiming that they were organizing a series of Pride and other LGBTIQ visibility events throughout the country, supported by Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party. The group even circulated AI-generated images showing Pashinyan at a fake Pride event in the capital, Yerevan. As part of this disinformation campaign, posters of same-sex couples were put up and later taken down in Yerevan to demonstrate proof of a supposedly coordinated initiative for the rights of sexual minorities. To date, there has not yet been a public Pride march in the country.
  • Election outcome. The Civil Contract party retained its control of the government, winning 49.74% of the vote.

Bangladesh

General election and constitutional referendum: February 12, 2026 

In the first election after the July revolution, hijras, trans, and gender-diverse people were subjected to voter intimidation and turned away from polling stations due to the mismatch between their gender expression and legal identities.

  • Barriers to voting for trans, gender-diverse, or intersex people: 
    • Voter intimidation: In at least six districts, local leaders campaigning for the Bangladesh Nationalist Party or the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami party threatened hijra and trans people with violence if they did not mobilize community members for particular candidates. While political coercion of minority groups in Bangladesh is not new, this election saw increased intimidation of hijras, trans people, and other gender-diverse voters, according to Inclusive Bangladesh, a group advocating for the rights of sexual and gender minorities. 
    • Disenfranchisement due to the mismatch between appearance and identity: Inclusive Bangladesh documented cases of polling officials turning away some hijra and trans people due to the mismatch between their appearance and identification documents. In some cases, polling officials informed trans people that their votes had already been cast.
    • Invisibility in voter rolls: Although the government legally recognized hijras in 2013, it has not established a uniform procedure to change legal gender markers, and several trans, hijra, and other gender-diverse people have reported experiencing abusive and humiliating practices in order to verify their gender identity. In addition, the national identity card issued by the Election Commission only recognizes “hijra” as the third-gender option, which could exclude other trans and gender-diverse people who do not identify with this term. Thousands of trans and hijra people did not register as “hijra” voters and voted with identity documents reflecting their assigned sex at birth, citing fear of stigma, as well as lack of awareness about or burdensome requirements related to gender marker changes. In 2026, there were only 1,234 voters registered as hijra according to official figures released by the Election Commission, whereas the 2022 national census counted 12,629 hijras, itself an undercount of people in Bangladesh who identified as third-gender, given that obtaining a “hijra” gender marker, while legally possible, involves a bureaucratic and sometimes abusive ordeal.
    • Abstention due to transphobia: In an interview published shortly before the election, a third-gender voter said that, due to previous experiences of transphobic harassment in polling areas, “many third-gender members like me no longer go to any polling centers. We won’t go this time either.” Voting lines are based on assigned sex, and there are no separate lines for people with third-gender markers, which sometimes meant that transfeminine voters had to queue with men to vote, in some cases resulting in harassment from fellow voters.
  • Discrimination or violence against LGBTIQ candidates:
    • Attacks on the only queer candidate: Right-wing opponents, religious leaders, and local media accused independent candidate Anowara Islam Rani, a hijra person and the only openly queer candidate in 2026, of promoting so-called Western ideology. According to Inclusive Bangladesh, “these narratives contributed to delegitimizing her candidacy and reinforcing suspicion toward LGBTIQ+ political participation more broadly.” Rani later withdrew from the race and called for reserved seats for transgender people and other marginalized communities in elections.
    • Expulsion of party member on grounds of sexuality: In March 2025, the student-led National Citizen Party removed Muntasir Mamun, an activist described in media reports as openly gay, from the central committee due to his advocacy for the rights of sexual and gender minorities. Negative reactions to his inclusion led some party leaders to publicly clarify their stance on the “mistake” of including Muntasir Mamun in the party and affirm that they would not allow “anything contrary to religious values.” Though Mamun was not a candidate, his case demonstrates the challenges queer people face in partisan politics.
  • Anti-LGBTIQ campaigning and political speech
    • Homophobic campaigning: In May 2025, the National Citizen Party’s Northern Region chief organizer expressed opposition to “any direct or indirect promotion of vile and destructive cultures such as homosexuality, transgender identity, or LGBTQ.” He characterized sexual and gender minorities as “mentally disturbed” and as “deadly diseases that destroy families, societies, and nations.”
    • Fearmongering around the referendum: Bangladesh also held a referendum in 2026 on the July Charter, a declaration signed by political parties outlining reforms to be enacted following the July 2024 revolution, alongside the general election. In January 2026, Value Movement (মূল্যবোধ আন্দোলন), a conservative civil society group, opposed articles in the July Charter seeking to promote equality, social justice, and women’s political participation, deeming them contrary to “Islamic values.” In the same press conference, it condemned the interim government’s “clear patronage of the LGBT, or homosexual, agenda…which deeply questions the nation's religious spirit, social fabric, and moral foundation,” and accused “media tycoons and NGO groups” of building a “civilization-destroying LGBT-friendly society.” In the same month, a religiously conservative opinion outlet published a commentary that similarly spread misinformation about how “the use of undefined terms such as ‘equality,’ ‘social justice,’ ‘groups,’ and ‘communities’ paves the way for the inclusion of Western ideologies regarding homosexual rights—specifically the LGBT agenda.” In February, Asif Mahtab—a former teacher who gained public notoriety for opposing the representation of trans people in textbooks and inciting followers to call for attacks against the office of a transgender civil society organization—also encouraged the public to vote “no” to the July Charter, which he claimed would lead to the imposition of “LGBT” and “Western” values. The measure won, with 62.74% of votes in favor of the July Charter.
    • Election outcome: The Bangladesh Nationalist Party won two-thirds of the seats in parliament, while the alliance led by Jamaat-e-Islami secured 77. The National Citizen Party, which was part of the alliance led by the Jamaat-e-Islami, contested elections for the first time in 2026. It won six seats.

Bolivia

Regional elections: March 22 and April 19, 2026

The only two openly queer candidates reported attacks, while some candidates resorted to fearmongering around “gender ideology.”

  • Discrimination or violence against LGBTIQ candidates: Colectivo TLGB Bolivia identified two openly queer candidates, both of whom encountered attacks due to their sexual orientation or gender identity. One of them, Diana Málaga, a trans woman and indigenous candidate for the La Paz city council, reported barriers to her candidacy based on her identity as a trans woman:
  • “Character assassination”: Málaga filed complaints against a social media influencer for “political violence against women” for a series of TikTok and Facebook posts against her candidacy. In some of the videos, the influencer misgendered her and asserted that “trans people are a pathology.” Málaga later withdrew her candidacy and obtained a protective order barring contact between her and the influencer. In 2012, Bolivia became the first country to enact a law explicitly prohibiting political harassment and political violence against women, defined to include acts of discrimination and violence that prevent women’s full political participation. 
  • Denial of identity as a woman: The organization also assisted Málaga in requesting internal action within the Movement for Sovereignty party in response to fellow members who accused her of “taking away space from cisgender women.” Bolivian election law requires political parties to present candidate lists composed of 50% men and 50% women (parity), with candidates arranged in alternating order by legal gender. Malaga’s inclusion in her party’s list as a woman led some members to “question her identity as a woman and her right to participate politically in that capacity,” according to Colectivo TLGB Bolivia.

    Neither of the two openly queer candidates identified in 2026 was elected. Apart from the two openly queer people who ran, other queer people were also solicited by political parties to stand as candidates, but did not accept the invitations due to fear that their sexuality and gender would be subject to public scrutiny.

  • Anti-LGBTIQ campaigning and political speech: Colectivo TLGB Bolivia observed that while most local candidates avoided speaking about sexual and gender minorities, several candidates made hateful remarks against queer people, suggesting that “there is an imposition of an external gender ideology that is not from Bolivia and that cannot be accepted” and that they would act against this influence once elected.
     

Colombia

Parliamentary election: March 8, 2026 
Presidential election: May 31, 2026

As voters and candidates, trans and nonbinary people experienced misgendering and online attacks despite progressive laws on gender identity and political violence. The president-elect publicly targeted “gender ideology.”

  • Barriers to voting for trans, gender-diverse, or intersex people: Electoral observers documented cases of polling officials subjecting trans voters to “disrespectful comments or treatment,” including misgendering, and two trans election observers were subjected to illegal demands for “extra proof” to validate their identity. These incidents occurred despite the National Electoral Council (CNE) having issued an official protocol stating that a mismatch between a person’s gender expression and the biodata on their ID cannot be used to deny them the right to vote.
  • Discrimination or violence against LGBTIQ candidates: While a gay man and a bisexual woman were elected to the House of Representatives, 80% or 26 out of the 32 openly queer candidates “reported receiving comments or attacks related to their sexual orientation or gender identity during the campaign.” All six openly trans and nonbinary candidates identified in 2026 reported “misgendering, mockery, and online discrimination.” 
    • Moral discrediting: Two cisgender gay male candidates reported several social media posts discussing their use of gay dating apps or participation in queer social settings as a way to discredit their candidacies.
    • Denial of nonbinary identity: Sue Duarte, a nonbinary candidate for the House of Representatives from Bogotá, reported that the left-wing Comunes party did not allow them to register as a nonbinary candidate. The party reportedly pressured Duarte to register under the “female” category for political reasons, despite the country allowing citizens to use “NB” markers on identity documents. 
    • Misgendering: In another example, a local municipal official called Andrea Romero, a trans woman candidate, a man on social media.
  • Anti-LGBTIQ campaigning and political speech: Far-right president-elect Abelardo de la Espriella railed against “gender ideology” throughout the campaign. During the launch of his presidential bid, he declared that he does “not accept that our children be conditioned, contaminated with gender ideology to try to change their view of sexuality.” De la Espriella ​​won with 49.66% of the vote after the second round, with Iván Cepeda of the left-wing Historic Pact finishing with 48.70%.
     

Costa Rica

Parliamentary election: March 8, 2026 
Presidential election: May 31, 2026

As voters and candidates, trans and nonbinary people experienced misgendering and online attacks despite progressive laws on gender identity and political violence. The president-elect publicly targeted “gender ideology.”

  • Barriers to voting for trans, gender-diverse, or intersex people: Electoral observers documented cases of polling officials subjecting trans voters to “disrespectful comments or treatment,” including misgendering, and two trans election observers were subjected to illegal demands for “extra proof” to validate their identity. These incidents occurred despite the National Electoral Council (CNE) having issued an official protocol stating that a mismatch between a person’s gender expression and the biodata on their ID cannot be used to deny them the right to vote.
  • Discrimination or violence against LGBTIQ candidates: While a gay man and a bisexual woman were elected to the House of Representatives, 80% or 26 out of the 32 openly queer candidates “reported receiving comments or attacks related to their sexual orientation or gender identity during the campaign.” All six openly trans and nonbinary candidates identified in 2026 reported “misgendering, mockery, and online discrimination.” 
    • Moral discrediting: Two cisgender gay male candidates reported several social media posts discussing their use of gay dating apps or participation in queer social settings as a way to discredit their candidacies.
    • Denial of nonbinary identity: Sue Duarte, a nonbinary candidate for the House of Representatives from Bogotá, reported that the left-wing Comunes party did not allow them to register as a nonbinary candidate. The party reportedly pressured Duarte to register under the “female” category for political reasons, despite the country allowing citizens to use “NB” markers on identity documents. 
    • Misgendering: In another example, a local municipal official called Andrea Romero, a trans woman candidate, a man on social media.
  • Anti-LGBTIQ campaigning and political speech: Far-right president-elect Abelardo de la Espriella railed against “gender ideology” throughout the campaign. During the launch of his presidential bid, he declared that he does “not accept that our children be conditioned, contaminated with gender ideology to try to change their view of sexuality.” De la Espriella ​​won with 49.66% of the vote after the second round, with Iván Cepeda of the left-wing Historic Pact finishing with 48.70%.
     

Cyprus

Parliamentary election: May 24, 2026

Far-right party Ethniko Laiko Metopo (ELAM), or National People’s Front, described queer-led families as abnormal and foreign to the country in a pre-election debate.

  • Anti-LGBTIQ campaigning and political speech: In a televised election debate, Christos Christou, presidential candidate of the far-right party ELAM, criticized the “LGBT agenda” and described queer-led families as abnormal and foreign to the country: “Regarding where it is better for a child to grow up or not, I believe it is better for him to grow up in a normal, traditional family with a mother, father, grandparents...Issues of tradition and institutions that have structured us for centuries, we now seek to destroy them, and instead adopt models completely foreign to our own culture.” ELAM finished third in the race, with 10.9% of the votes, securing eight of the 56 seats in parliament.
     

France

Municipal elections: March 15 and 22, 2026

Within a political climate marked by the rise of the far right, several openly queer candidates reported attacks based on their sexual orientation or gender identity.

  • Discrimination or violence against LGBTIQ candidates: Several openly queer candidates reported attacks based on their sexual orientation or gender identity in 2026. For example:
    • Threats against a gay candidate: Marc Lorand-Brionne, an openly gay municipal council candidate in the commune of Valframbert who was placed first on his party’s list during the campaign, described his experience in a press release: “We have been attacked in the lowest possible way, through abusive remarks, discriminatory rumors, and anonymous homophobic letters left at my home. More recently, an empty shotgun shell was found in my mailbox, marking a new level of intimidation.” Lorand-Brionne’s list won the election; while a victory would typically result in the first person on the list being elected as mayor by their fellow candidates, Lorand-Brionne’s running mates maneuvered against him, instead selecting the third person on the list.
    • Homophobia from fellow party members: In November 2025, openly lesbian mayoral candidate Sabrina Decanton withdrew from the local race in the commune of Saint-Ouen-sur-Seine due to homophobic remarks from fellow Ecologists Party members, who cited her sexual orientation as an obstacle to her candidacy and to a potential victory. The party did not qualify for the second round, winning only 8.38% of the vote in the first round. In May 2026, the party suspended the six members in question for periods ranging from six months to a year. 
       

Hungary

Parliamentary election: April 12, 2026

Right-wing parties rallied against the “gender threat” and the “LGBTQ lobby” and attacked the Tisza Party for its supposed support for LGBTIQ people’s rights.

  • Anti-LGBTIQ campaigning and political speech 
    • Fidesz: In January 2026, in a party congress where he was chosen as the party’s nominee for prime minister, Viktor Orbán rallied against the “gender threat emanating from Brussels,” and criticized what he perceived as the European Union’s support for diverse families, trans people, and “sensitization and propaganda for deviancies…in schools, kindergartens, and bookstores.” 
    • Our Homeland Movement: In its 2026 electoral platform, the far-right party Our Homeland Movement targeted the “LGBTQ lobby and conscious childlessness ideology.” It described “gender ideology” and “the elimination of traditional gender roles” as part of a “campaign against humanity,” and blamed the EU for “violently spreading gender ideology.” It also called on social media platforms to cease applying a “double standard” that, it claimed, censors conservative content but “forces deviant propaganda, a cultural Marxist, anti-white, anti-Christian, anti-family worldview on its users.” 
    • Attacking Tisza: Right-wing candidates attacked at least three Tisza candidates for their perceived support for LGBTIQ people’s rights or through claims around their sexual orientation. Tisza won a supermajority in 2026, securing 141 of the 199 seats in the National Assembly.
      • “Gender propaganda”: Right-wing political figures, including Viktor Orbán, other Fidesz party leaders, and László Toroczkai, Our Homeland Movement’s president, accused Kriszta Bódis, a Tisza candidate for the National Assembly, of spreading “gender propaganda” for recommending a queer-affirming children’s book by lesbian organization Labrisz. 
      • Homophobic disinformation: Pro-Orbán and right-wing media outlets amplified malicious rumors around a sexual relationship between Márk Radnai, vice chairman of the party, and party leader Peter Magyar. Leading up to the elections, a Facebook page run by an unknown user posted purported audio recordings of a conversation between Magyar and his former female romantic partner, as well as between the latter and Radnai, the legitimacy of which has not been verified. Pro-Orbán media outlets spread the recordings and claimed they were proof that, in the words of one outlet, “Péter Magyar is having a sexual relationship with Márk Radnai.” On April 10, two days before the election, a far-right Hungarian website posted an AI-generated video with the title, “Márk Radnai’s ass is dry,” in reference to the audio recording. The video negatively depicted other Tisza and EU figures, independent journalists, and queer celebrities, and showed Magyar putting on makeup, feeding into malicious rumors about his sexuality. Orban later called the website his favorite. 
  • Election outcomes: In 2026, Tisza won 141 of 199 seats in the National Assembly, securing a supermajority. Magyar succeeded Orbán as prime minister, and both Bódis and Radnai became members of the National Assembly. The Fidesz-KDNP (Christian Democrats) alliance lost the supermajority it had held since 2010, finishing with only 52 of the 199 seats. Our Homeland Movement finished third in 2026, maintaining the six seats it won in 2022. 
     

Municipal elections: May 16, 2026

Three openly queer candidates endured queerphobic attacks on social media, while the right-wing Centre Party targeted Pride flags in public buildings.

  • Discrimination or violence against LGBTIQ candidates: In November 2025, six months before the municipal elections, a mental health advocate drew attention to “hateful comments” against two city councilors—a nonbinary person and a trans woman—running for the leadership of the Pirate Party. Social media users responded to a Facebook post announcing their candidacies with demeaning remarks regarding their gender identities, misgendering them or describing them as “confused” or mentally ill. Oktavía Hrund Guðrúnar Jóns won with 95 out of 174 votes, becoming the first openly nonbinary political party leader in Iceland, while Alexandra Briem, a trans woman, lost with 79 votes. A representative of queer group Samtökin ‘78 told Outright that Arna Magnea Danks, a trans actress, activist, and candidate from Vinstrið/The Left, was subjected to similar comments on social media leading up to the election. Even prior to her candidacy, as a public figure, Danks had faced online hate rising to the level of death threats. Danks did not win a seat in 2026.
  • Anti-LGBTIQ campaigning and political speech: The right-wing Centre Party attempted to cast Pride flags as unpatriotic. 
    • Kópavogur: In Kópavogur, Iceland’s second most populous municipality, the local Centre Party released a video ahead of the election in which the local party leader is seen pointing to a rainbow flag in a school. “If you would rather see the Icelandic flag at schools in Kópavogur, like this video and vote for the Centre Party on May 16…Away with the woke.” The party only won one seat in Kópavogur, with 10.5% of the vote. 
    • Reykjavík: In the capital Reykjavík, Ari Edwald, the leader of the local Centre Party, complained the rainbow flag had been superseded by the Pride progress flag, which is intentionally inclusive of trans and intersex people and people of color. The party, known for its racist anti-immigration positions, finished third in the capital, with 12.6% of the votes.
       

India

State assembly elections: April 2026

A voter revision exercise disproportionately disenfranchised hijra, trans, and gender-diverse voters.

  • Barriers to voting for trans, gender-diverse, or intersex people
    • "Special intensive revision”: The Election Commission’s updating of electoral rolls through house-to-house enumeration and verification of old identity documents (from the 2002 voter’s list) disproportionately impacted ethnic and religious minorities. Muslim Indian citizens were reportedly overrepresented among “deleted” voters in some localities, with some top officials framing the deletions as a way to crack down on “illegal Bangladeshi immigrants.” This verification exercise also affected trans, hijra, and gender-diverse voters, including those who were registered using their birth name and sex in 2002 and have since changed their legal names and gender markers. In cases in which gender-diverse people fled their homes to escape violence, were declared dead by their biological families, or had their documents burned by their relatives, they were unable to reconnect with their families to retrieve the required documentation. In addition, the “transgender identity card,” a government-issued ID recognizing a person’s transgender identity, was not explicitly listed among the supporting documents accepted by the Commission. In Tamil Nadu, over 20% of third-gender voters who were on the electoral rolls before the special intensive revision disappeared from the voter list, with the number of registered third-gender voters dropping from 9,464 to 7,617. 
    • Voter exclusion: A representative of a regional queer group told Outright that in one state, the group documented 15 cases in which voters were refused access to voting in polling stations due to the mismatch between their gender expression and the name or sex on their documents. Voting lines in the country are based on legal gender, and the trans voters in that state were made to stand in a separate line and told to vote after everyone in the “male” and “female” lines had already voted. They reportedly waited until 6 p.m., when voting stations closed, and were therefore unable to cast their votes.
    • Abstention: In the state of Bihar, only 10% or 187 out of 1,700 registered third-gender voters went out to vote in a legislative election marked by a historic turnout rate of 67%.
       

Japan

Early general elections: February 8, 2026

While it was not the focus of their campaigns, two right-wing parties targeted LGBTIQ-inclusive reforms.

  • Barriers to voting for trans, gender-diverse, or intersex people: Several member organizations of J-ALL, the national LGBTQ coalition, reported that trans people feared barriers to voting due to gendered electoral practices. For example, in at least five municipalities in the prefectures of Tokyo and Chiba, voting lines were divided into male and female. While there is no national law or policy that requires gender-segregated voting lines, local officials are required to submit sex-segregated voter data to the national government, leading some officials to resort to gendered queues. In some municipalities, the “polling place admission ticket,” a form of voter identification distributed to eligible voters ahead of the election, showed the name and sex marker of the voter. J-ALL noted that these could expose trans people, especially those who had not yet changed their legal names and gender markers, to questioning and scrutiny. Some of its member organizations have been working with local authorities to end these gendered practices and guarantee privacy and safety in voting.
  • Anti-LGBTIQ campaigning and political speech
    • Anti-inclusion platform: The Conservative Party of Japan, which was founded in 2023 to oppose the Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (SOGI) Understanding Promotion Act, reaffirmed its opposition to the law in 2026. In its campaign platform, the party vowed to amend the law to remove provisions on the education of children. The law does not prohibit discrimination and only “encourages” schools, except kindergartens, to “take necessary measures for the pupils, etc. of those schools to deepen their understanding of the diversity of sexual orientation and gender identity.” The party was eliminated from the House of Representatives, losing the one seat it held before the lower house’s dissolution. 
    • LGBTIQ advocacy as “communism”: In a campaign speech on February 5, 2026, Sohei Kamiya, leader of the right-wing party Sanseito, attacked “gender-free ideology,” which he compared to communism. While Kamiya said he had “no intention of discriminating against LGBT people,” he affirmed that “if men don’t live as men and women don’t live as women, society becomes strange.” Sanseito significantly advanced in 2026, increasing its seats in the 465-member House of Representatives from two to 15. 
       

Nepal

General election: March 5, 2026

A candidate for the right-wing nationalist party warned that marriage equality would “destroy the country” and criticized an opposing party’s compliance with the Supreme Court’s 2023 order on registering same-sex marriages.

  • Anti-LGBTIQ campaigning and political speech: In a video recording shared with Outright by the LGBTIQ organization Blue Diamond Society, Surendra Bhandari, a parliamentary candidate in Kathmandu running with the right-wing Hindu nationalist Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), said in a campaign speech that “no one recognizes same-sex marriage” in Nepal and that “registering same-sex marriages means attacking the civilization of this country, wreaking havoc, and destroying this country.” He also blasted Ravi Lamichhane, leader of the opposing Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), for implementing the Supreme Court’s 2023 interim decision to register same-sex marriages as Home Minister, and called on the audience not to vote for Lamichhane or the RSP. Following a formal complaint by activists, the Election Commission formally sought clarification from Bhandari for his potential breach of the Election Code of Conduct, which prohibits election campaigning that “hurts the sentiments, honor, character, or reputation” of protected groups, including “sexual and gender minority communities.” Blue Diamond Society confirmed with Outright that the video of the campaign speech has since been deleted online. Bhandari’s remarks do not necessarily reflect the RPP’s position, as there have been differing views within the leadership of the party on marriage equality. 
     

Peru

General election: April 12-13 and June 7, 2026

Several candidates reported queerphobic attacks, while at least two political figures from the left and the right opposed sexual and gender diversity in campaign-related speeches.

  • Discrimination or violence against LGBTIQ candidates: 
    • Transphobic attacks: In a televised debate, Frank Krklec, a congressional candidate for the far-right Renovación Popular, repeatedly misgendered Gahela Cari of the left-wing coalition Venceremos, who had become Peru’s first out trans congressional candidate in 2021. In February 2026, two months before the elections, the police violently apprehended and arbitrarily detained Cari and other trans activists in a protest against then-acting president José Jerí. Cari did not win a seat in 2026.
    • Questioning candidates’ sexuality: Journalists repeatedly questioned Carlos Álvarez, presidential candidate of the País para Todos party, about his alleged homosexuality—unnecessary scrutiny that nevertheless led him to defend people’s right to “live your sexuality however you want.” Similarly, Fabricio Escajadillo, presenter of a Christian streaming channel, questioned Norma Yarrow, Renovación Popular’s vice-presidential candidate, about her alleged support for same-sex civil unions, hinting at rumors about Yarrow’s sexual orientation. In response, Yarrow declared her intention to file a case against the presenter and affirmed that “I’m not LGBTQ+, I’m not in favor of civil unions.” Neither Álvarez nor Yarrow was elected in 2026. The right-wing Popular Force party’s ticket—led by presidential candidate Keiko Fujimori, with Luis Galarreta as first vice-presidential candidate and Miki Torres as second vice-presidential candidate—won the runoff with 50.13% of the vote.
  • Anti-LGBTIQ campaigning and political speech
    • Gender diversity as an “aberration”: In an online interview, Antauro Igor Humala Tasso, leader of the party ANTAURO (National Alliance of Workers, Farmers, University Students and Reservists), used a homophobic slur to refer to queer people, and described gender nonconformity as “disrespectful” and an “aberration.”
    • Weaponizing children: In a televised debate, Frank Krklec, a congressional candidate from Lima for the far-right party Renovación Popular, affirmed that his party was “against any indoctrination or ideology that seeks to threaten the integrity of our children” and described gender-affirming healthcare as mutilation. Krklec was elected to the Chamber of Deputies.
       

Serbia

Local election: March 29, 2026

A homophobic “exposé” sought to undermine an opposition candidate.

  • Discrimination or violence against LGBTIQ candidates: Days before a local election, a pro-government tabloid posted an article including screenshots purportedly showing Marko Andrejević, an opposition candidate in the city of Bor, using the gay dating app Grindr, and suggested that he has a “very questionable character.” LGBTIQ organizations condemned the article and declared that they would approach independent state authorities on equality and data protection “in order to determine responsibility for such conduct.” While the ruling coalition retained its majority in the city, Andrejević was nevertheless elected, with the opposition list winning nearly 40% of the vote. 

South Korea

Local elections: June 3, 2026

Several candidates for local education superintendent campaigned against LGBTIQ-inclusive education.

  • Anti-LGBTIQ campaigning and political speech: In Seoul, a candidate for the Superintendent of the Seoul Metropolitan Office of Education, Cho Jun-hyuk, put up campaign banners around the city saying “Expel queer, homosexual education.” He released photos of himself and five candidates in other regions carrying banners that said, “Out with queer and homosexuality education.” Cho also vowed to end the annual Pride event in Seoul Plaza. Another candidate in Seoul, Kim Young-bae, campaigned with banners saying, “Oppose homosexuality” and “Oppose the antidiscrimination law.” Kim affirmed, “Education that repeatedly instills or glorifies homosexuality among minors as something natural and normal must be stopped.” Progressive candidates, some of whom opposed this hateful rhetoric, won 10 of the 16 superintendent races nationwide, including in Seoul.
     

Uganda

General election: January 15, 2026

Human rights groups documented an uptick of repression and violence against sexual and gender minorities during the electoral period. Political figures weaponized the Anti-Homosexuality Act against opponents.

  • Anti-LGBTIQ campaigning and political speech: 
    • “Promoting homosexuality”: According to rights groups, candidates of the ruling National Resistance Movement, including then-Speaker of the Parliament Annet Anita Among, accused their opponents of promoting homosexuality,” a charge that could result in 20 years in prison under the Anti-Homosexuality Act. The National Resistance Movement won a supermajority in 2026, after securing 359 of 529 seats in parliament, gaining 23 new seats.
    • Foreign agents accusation: In his victory speech, after winning 71% of the vote, President Yoweri Museveni called opposition forces “traitors” and “terrorists” who are “working with some foreigners and some homosexual groups.” According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’ pre-election briefing, this rhetoric is part of a broad pattern, “where certain politicians weaponized the homophobic agenda to bolster their campaigns and popularity, which would likely compromise full and equal effective participation of LGBT persons in elections.”
  • Increased criminalization or repression: 
    • Uptick of repression: According to Human Rights Awareness and Promotion Forum (HRAPF), in January 2026, “an immediate surge was noted, especially in targeted arrests of suspected LGBTQ persons on the basis of this suspicion alone, a few days after the elections were concluded.” HRAPF documented 62 cases, including arrests, violence, threats, evictions, and online harassment linked to sexual orientation and gender identity. This is a significant increase from the 38 cases it documented in December 2025.
    • Closure of queer organization: Six days before the election, the National Bureau for Non-Governmental Organisations shut down Chapter Four Uganda, an organization working on the rights of sexual and gender minorities, and six other civil society groups, alleging that the group threatened the “security and the laws of Uganda.”
       

United Kingdom

Local, Senedd/Welsh Parliament, and Scottish Parliament elections: May 7, 2026

Conservative and right-wing parties vowed to repeal LGBTIQ-inclusive legislation in their campaign platforms.

  • Discrimination or violence against LGBTIQ candidates: Following their election, Iris Duane and Q Manivannan, the first openly transgender Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs), reported receiving hateful comments from social media accounts, media platforms, and public figures due to their gender identities and immigrant status. Due to the backlash, parliament security staff had to escort Manivannan from their office to the chamber for their swearing-in ceremony.
  • Anti-LGBTIQ campaigning and political speech: Several right-wing parties proposed repealing LGBTIQ-inclusive reforms:
    • Scotland: Reform UK endeavored to abolish the Hate Crime and Public Order (Scotland) Act and criticized the “woke policies on immigration and gender” of the ruling Scottish National Party. Some Reform candidates also used anti-trans rhetoric in their campaign, criticizing other parties and suggesting that they “don’t even know what a woman is” for supporting trans-inclusive policies. The Scottish Conservatives vowed to scrap the LGBT Inclusive Education Guidance and introduce “parent panels to oversee the content their children are taught on socially contentious issues such as sex education.” The party also promised to stop collecting data on gender identity and remove Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) roles in the government. The Scottish National Party retained its control of Parliament, but lost six seats in 2026. Reform UK entered the Scottish Parliament for the first time in 2026, securing 17 out of 129 seats, while the Conservatives finished with only 12 seats, losing the 19 seats it won in 2021.
    • Wales: Reform UK committed to scrap diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) roles in the public sector and ending the use of inclusive language in the National Health Service. Reform UK entered the Senedd or the Welsh Parliament for the first time in 2026, finishing with 34 out of 96 seats, a close second to the Party of Wales’ 43 seats.